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Abstract
We identify robust statistical patterns in the frequency and severity of violent attacks by terrorist organizations as they grow
and age. Using group-level static and dynamic analyses of terrorist events worldwide from 1968–2008 and a simulation
model of organizational dynamics, we show that the production of violent events tends to accelerate with increasing size
and experience. This coupling of frequency, experience and size arises from a fundamental positive feedback loop in which
attacks lead to growth which leads to increased production of new attacks. In contrast, event severity is independent of
both size and experience. Thus larger, more experienced organizations are more deadly because they attack more
frequently, not because their attacks are more deadly, and large events are equally likely to come from large and small
organizations. These results hold across political ideologies and time, suggesting that the frequency and severity of
terrorism may be constrained by fundamental processes.
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Introduction
Much research on patterns in terrorism has been inspired by
particular historic events and ‘‘waves’’ of specific forms of terrorist
attacks [1,2]. Just as the rise in international skyjackings in the
1970s led to a resurgence of studies of terrorism, the 11 September
2001 attacks renewed interest in why groups resort to terrorism,
the specific choice of attack targets, and the relative effectiveness of
particular counterterrorism measures. As a result, many research-
ers have developed typologies of specific forms of terrorism and
highlighted the distinctiveness of different terrorist groups. By
contrast, in this manuscript we examine whether there are
fundamental patterns in the frequency and severity (number of
deaths) of deadly events carried out by terrorist organizations and
what mechanisms might generate them.
Little research on terrorism has focused on directly modeling
individual event frequency and severity, and the way these change
over an organization’s lifetime. When deaths are considered, they
are typically aggregated and used as a covariate to understand
other aspects of terrorism, e.g., trends over time [3,4], the when,
where, what, how and why of the resort to terrorism [5–7],
differences between organizations [8], or the incident rates or
outcomes of events [3,9]. Such efforts have used time series
analysis [3,4,9], qualitative models or human expertise of specific
scenarios, actors, targets or attacks [10] or quantitative models
based on factor analysis [11,12], social networks [13,14] or formal
adversarial interactions [6,15,16].
Our approach is different and complementary to these
approaches, focusing on global trends and patterns in the
frequency and severity of events [17–25], rather than on event
particulars or motivations. By focusing our analysis at the global
scale, the importance of individual decisions in specific contexts is
in fact lessened, due to the central limit theorem and the rough
independence of individual events; as a result, the importance of
generic non-strategic processes is enhanced and these processes, if
any, may be studied. Explanations of such patterns must thus focus
on processes or constraints that are independent of variations in
context or specific motivation and may include physical con-
straints, network effects and endogenous population dynamics,
which are well suited to explain the behavior of strategically
unco¨ordinated populations of actors [24]. This approach to
investigating the fundamental laws of terrorism has much in
common with that of statistical physics, in which the self-averaging
properties of independent events allows for interesting population-
level properties to emerge from microscopic system chaos. This
statistical physics-style approach is increasingly being applied to
study complex social systems [26–28], yielding a number of novel
insights.
Here, we aim to shed new light on the fundamental processes
governing the frequency and severity of terrorist events by
studying their statistical relationship with the organizations that
generate them. Our aim is to identify global patterns in these
relationships and to explain their origin mechanistically. We
employ a combination of disaggregated data analysis, studying a
large database of terrorist events worldwide from 1968–2007,
statistical modeling and inference, computational modeling and
regression analysis to validate our mechanistic hypotheses. By
shedding new light on these large-scale patterns and trends in
terrorism, and on how such patterns emerge from local-level
behaviors, this large-scale statistical or pattern-based approach can
supplement formal models of strategic interactions, inform
counter-terrorism policy and clarify our general ability to forecast
or anticipate future terrorist events or trends.
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Patterns in global conflict
A pattern-based approach to studying conflict owes much to the
seminal work in the early 20th century of Lewis Fry Richardson–a
physicist and meteorologist known for collecting data on conflicts
(‘‘deadly quarrels’’), modeling arms races using differential
equations, as well as early contributions to understanding the
frequencies and severities of wars. Specifically, Richardson [29,30]
identified the remarkable pattern that the frequency of wars decays
like the inverse power of their severity. (Power-law distributions
can indicate unusual underlying or endogenous processes, e.g.,
feedback loops, network effects, self-organization or optimization.
From a purely statistical perspective, power-law distributions
generate large events orders of magnitude more often than we
would expect under a Normal assumption. Recently, power-law
distributions have been identified in a wide range of social and
biological systems [31]. See [32], [33] and [34] for reviews, or
Appendix A of [35] for a gentle introduction.) This empirical
pattern implies that there is no fundamental statistical difference
between rare but catastrophic wars and more common but less
severe wars–the likelihoods of both are described by a single
mathematical function:
Pr (event with severity x) ! x{a,
where x counts the number of fatalities (severity) and a is the
‘‘scaling exponent,’’ which controls how quickly the frequency
decreases as severity increases. It also implies that the underlying
social and political processes for both large and small wars may be
fundamentally the same, i.e., large wars may simply be ‘‘scaled
up’’ versions of small wars. In general, the identification of a power
law implies that studying the statistically more common events can
shed light on certain aspects of extremely rare events. (Seismol-
ogists study large earthquakes in this way: the frequencies of both
large and small quakes follow a power-law distribution, called the
Gutenberg-Richter Law, and the physical processes that generate
both small and large quakes are fundamentally the same).
Recently, Clauset et al. [20,31] showed that this same pattern–a
power-law, ‘‘Richardson’s Law’’–also holds for the frequency of
severe terrorist attacks (reported fatalities) worldwide, while [23]
suggest a similar pattern for events within insurgencies. The
power-law pattern in terrorism is highly robust: it persists over the
past 40 years despite large structural and political changes in the
international system and is independent of the type of weapon
used (explosives, firearms, arson, knives, etc.), the emergence and
increasing popularity of suicide attacks, the demise of many
individual terrorist organizations, and the economic development
of the target country.
Thus, fundamental regularities in terrorism can and do emerge
at the global level despite the highly contingent and context-
specific nature of the individual attacks, conflicts and decisions.
Insights into how these patterns’ arise will likely shed new light on
the underlying social or political processes that drive and constrain
global trends and on effective policies for responding to or
managing those processes.
Methods
We consider the frequency and severity of attacks over the
lifetime of individual terrorist organizations, and the question of
whether organizations exhibit common statistical patterns in these
behaviors. We argue that organization size (number of personnel)
plays a fundamental role in limiting the overall frequency, but not
the severity, of violent events by a group. The key idea is that
organization size and its overall production rate of events are
linked. If events lead to growth in any way, then this link implies a
positive feedback loop in which each attack increases the
production rate of future attacks. Thus, a terrorist organization
can be viewed as a kind of factory whose principal product is
political violence, and whose proceeds are reinvested in increased
production capacity.
To test these ‘‘developmental dynamics’’ hypotheses, we present
novel statistical analyses of the behavior of nearly 400 terrorist
organizations worldwide over the period 1968–2008. We find
strong evidence for precisely this kind of generic acceleration in
event production. This supports the notion that an organization’s
available labor, i.e., the size of its militant wing, is a fundamental
constraint on the overall frequency of its attacks. We further show
that the rate at which an organization cycles through the positive
feedback loop can depend on covariates like its political ideology,
with religiously-motivated organizations accelerating (growing) the
fastest. In contrast, we find no evidence that event severity depends
on organizational size or experience. Instead, the distribution of
attack severities follows a rough form of Richardson’s Law
independent of size, experience or political motivation.
These results imply that very large events are equally likely to be
generated by small groups as by large groups, and that larger
organizations are indeed more deadly [8], not because their
individual attacks are systematically more spectacular but because
they typically carry out many more attacks. That is, the size of the
beast directly determines the overall level of terror activity
(frequency) but not the quality (severity) of those actions.
Recently, Johnson et al. [25] used a similar approach to analyze
the timing of events in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, which
was in turn based on an earlier version of this manuscript [22].
Although similar statistical patterns to the ones we describe here
were observed in those conflicts, a different explanation was
offered for their origin. We will revisit this comparison and
comment on the problems our statistical results pose for the
explanation offered by [25].
Impact of Size on Frequency
H1 Labor-constraints: the overall production rate of violent
events by an organization depends on its size, and thus the
time between consecutive attacks Dt is roughly inversely
proportional to the size s of the organization. Mathemati-
cally, s/1/Dt.
In other words, the production of terrorist events cannot be
automated. If this were possible, organizations could produce
arbitrary numbers of events without needing to grow in size, much
like a fully automated factory requires essentially no human
personnel to function. (In this light, cyber terrorism is an interesting
case: it remains unclear to what degree the planning and execution
of cyber terrorist attacks can be done automatically, by computers.
Our current belief is that cyber terrorism is also not mass
produceable and thus some labor constraint will persist, although
it may be substantially lessened relative to physical terrorism).
Instead, we argue that each terrorist event requires significant
human involvement, e.g., to conceive, plan and execute it. This
requirement for human effort implies that for the production rate
of an organization to decrease, it must add additional members to
produce them. And, the resultant increased rate occurs not
because more hands make any individual event proceed more
quickly, but because multiple events may be carried out in parallel.
That is, the overall production rate of the organization is like the
production rate of an entire factory; as the factory (organization)
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adds internal independent production lines (terrorist cells), the
effective time between new events falls even though each
production line operates at a constant rate.
It is important to recognize that H1 does not imply that the only
way to increase the group-level production rate of attacks is
through organizational growth. Indeed, many aspects of event
production surely do benefit from technology or efficiency
improvements [36–39]. Instead, H1 implies that such factors can
only moderate, not eliminate, the fundamental constraint that size
places on production. To the extent that these factors decrease the
time between an organization’s events, the literature on learning
suggests that the overall impact will be modest [39]. In contrast,
increases in labor, which allow many terrorist cells to operate in
parallel, can lead to much larger improvements.
Finally, we note that this constraint should be strongest for small
organizations, who likely have the worst access to efficiency-
improving resources like specialized personnel, training facilities or
factories and who may reap the largest benefit, e.g., media
visibility, from striving to maximize their event production.
Because most organizations begin small and grow over time, this
should be most evidence early in the lifetime of an organization. (A
spatial corollary of H1 is that if an ‘‘organization’’ is defined as
those militants within some geographic locale, e.g., a province or
district, then the frequency of events within that locale will be
roughly inversely proportional to the number of militants there.
That is, the s!1=Dt relationship should hold when both s and Dt
are defined by a geographic boundary. Organizational ‘‘growth’’
can then be understood as either immigration or recruitment of
new militants).
Events, Recruitment and Growth
What role do attacks play in changing organizational size? If an
event gains the organization wider visibility among potential
members or sympathizers, the organization may grow in size as a
result of that event. (Decreases in size are likely driven by distinct
social processes (see [40]), which we do not consider here).
H2 Event-recruitment: organizational growth (increased s) is
partly driven by recruitment associated with the production
of new events (increased k), i.e., events lead to recruitment
which leads to organizational growth. Mathematically, ds/
dk.0.
H2 does not imply that growth comes only from violence-
related recruitment. So long as recruitment is partly based on the
production of violent events, H2 implies a correlation between
increases in size and increased event production.
Frequency Acceleration
Together, H1 and H2 imply a positive feedback loop in which
attacks lead to recruitment which leads to organizational growth
and thus an increased group-level production of new attacks. So
long as a portion of the growth is allocated to producing additional
events, i.e., so long as the militant wing grows with the overall
organization, H1 and H2 jointly imply H3.
H3 Frequency-acceleration: as an organization carries out more
attacks (increased k), the time between subsequent attacks Dt
decreases. Mathematically, dDt/dk,0.
That is, H1 predicts s!1=Dt while H2 predicts ds=dkw0.
Eliminating the common factor of s yields the prediction that
dDt=dkv0, in which the continued production of violent events
produces a decreasing delay between those events. (This dynam-
ical relationship produces a similar pattern to that observed in
‘‘learning’’ or ‘‘progress curves,’’ in which continued production
covaries with lowered production costs or time [36,39,41].
Although the pattern is similar, the mechanism is different).
Impact of Size on Severity
Increased size may bring greater access to capital and skilled
labor, e.g., experienced professionals, advanced arms, intelligence,
etc., and thus more spectacular attacks.
H4 Severity-increase: the severity x of a new attack increases
with organizational size s and, via H2, the number of attacks
k. Mathematically, dx/ds.0 and dx/dk.0, respectively.
Combined with H2, H3 implies that attacks by experienced,
larger groups should be consistently and significantly more deadly
than those of less experienced or smaller groups.
H4 assumes a tangible benefit for maximizing the severity of
attacks, e.g., to gain wider visibility for the organization’s cause or
to demonstrate power or resolve. Such incentives are not foregone
conclusions: severe attacks may also attract harsh attention from
state-level actors, leading to repression, police action or the
destruction of physical or financial resources. They may also
induce counter-productive effects on potential sympathizers, e.g.,
due to the shockingness of spectacular events. As a result, we
consider the theoretical argument supporting the severity-increase
hypothesis to be marginal.
Results
Model of terrorist organizations
To illustrate these interactions between an organization’s size
and the frequency and severity of attacks over its lifetime, we
construct a simple model of a terrorist organization’s development
(see Figure 1 for a schematic).
Historically, terrorist organizations begin as a small collections
of terrorism-inclined individuals [42]. Let this initial collection be
composed of roughly g individuals, which denotes the typical or
characteristic size of a terrorist cell. The particular value of g is not
important, but may depend political ideology, socio-economic
context [43], the attack’s target, etc. The cell plans and conducts
its first attack, which gains it some visibility, via either traditional
media coverage or informal channels. Subsequent recruitment
yields a number of additional members n (H2), and now the
organization is larger. Again, the particular value of n is not
important, but likely depends on context-specific factors.
Each cell continues planning and carrying out new attacks,
roughly once every t days (H1). Newly recruited members form
new cells, of size g (H1) and new cells plan and carry out their own
attacks in parallel. It is this parallelism that allows the larger
organization to appear to be acting more quickly, even though the
planning time t for any particular event remains fixed. An attack
by any cell leads to overall organizational growth via recruitment
(H2), which in turn increases the organization’s overall production
rate of attacks by adding new cells (H3). Finally, as the group
grows, the increased manpower also increases its ability to carry
out more severe events (H4), e.g., because more supporting roles
allow better surveillance, access to better equipment, etc.
Coordinating the activities of these additional individuals, or the
development of non-violent initiatives like a political wing or the
provision of social services, will draw some members away from
Developmental Dynamics of Terrorist Organizations
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these militant activities. However, so long as recruitment continues
to grow the number of militant cells, the positive feedback loop
remains.
This simple model intentionally omits many factors, such as
organizational structure, political motivation, geography, etc., that
are likely to impact the behavior of any particular organization.
We also intentionally omit any potential response by state-level
actors and their consequences on the organization’s evolution.
This last decision is made in order to focus on the development of
the organization, i.e., its early lifetime, where labor constraints are
likely most profound, although such processes could naturally be
added. Omitting these factors keep the model simple and allows us
to make quantitative predictions of the generic relationship
between organization size and the frequency and severity of its
attacks via direct numerical simulation. To mimic the natural
variation between particular events, for each new event being
planned by a cell, we draw a delay t from a fixed distribution. (In
general, our results hold so long as the distribution of t is well-
behaved and stationary with respect to k.) Specification details and
computer code for the simulation are given in Text S1.
Each simulated terrorist organization generates a unique
sequence of events representing the collective behavior of its cells
over time, and we extract the generic behavior by computing
quantiles over variables of interest for many such simulated
organizations. Here, we are interested in how the delay between
subsequent attacks Dt varies with cumulative number of events k
(H3), and how the size of the organization, measured by the
number of cells s=g varies with calendar time t from the first event
(H2). H4 predicts that event severity correlates with organization
size and thus no additional information is gained by explicitly
simulating event severities.
Figure 2 shows the results for 10,000 simulated organizations,
for three choices of the ratio n=g, which represents the growth rate
of the organization’s militant wing. When n=gv1 regime,
organizational growth is slow because multiple events are required
to establish a new terrorist cell; but, when n=gw1, organizational
growth is fast because each event produces at least one new cell.
The generic behavior of our model is clear: (i) organizational
size grows exponentially with time, at rate n=g, and (ii) the
feedback between size and production rate induces a strong
correlation between experience, size and the frequency of events.
Finally, the model produces a universal functional relationship
between delay Dt and cumulative production k of the form
Dt!k{1, and this relationship is independent of the growth rate
n=g.
This latter point is worth reiterating: so long as each new event
leads to some marginal increase in the overall production rate
(H2), a positive feedback loop between size and event production
will exist. This feedback will be linear Dt!k{1 if the growth rate
n=g does not vary with experience k. If the militant wing is a
decreasing fraction of the overall organization (n=g decreases over
time), the feedback will be sub-linear and k{b with bv1, while if
it increases with time, the feedback will be super-linear and bw1.
These properties imply that if a growing organization does
provoke responses from state-level actors, these responses will not
break the feedback loop unless they succeed in both limiting the
growth and reducing the size of the organization, a point to which
we will return later.
These quantitative predictions can be tested with empirical data
by examining Dt as a function of k across many organizations. If
Dt!k{1 holds in the data, we have strong evidence for precisely
the size-mediated feedback loop described here.
Empirical data
Organizational size data were drawn from the Big Allied And
Dangerous (BAAD) data set [8], which offers the currently best
available size estimates for terrorist organizations worldwide.
Other sources of size data lack the breadth or temporal resolution
for accurate analysis. For instance, the START program and the
MIPT database previously held a small number of estimates of
uncertain accuracy, generated by Detica, Inc., a British defense
contractor, and [44] compiled a database of information on 649
terrorist groups that included only estimates of the maximum size
over a group’s entire lifetime. The BAAD data were generated by
a survey of domain experts at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies (MIIS) who estimated the rough order of
magnitude (1–100, 100–1000, 1000–10,000 and w10,000 per-
sonnel) of the maximum size achieved by each of 381 groups,
between 1998 and 2005, identified in the [45] event database. Of
these, 161 organizations conducted at least one deadly attack, and
80 conducted at least two in that period.
To ensure good compatibility with this organization list, event
data were drawn from the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base [45],
which contained 35,668 terrorism events, of which 13,274 resulted
in at least one fatality, as of 29 January 2008. (Other sources of
event data include the Global Terrorism Database [46], the
Worldwide Incident Tracking System [47] and the ITERATE
data [48]. We note that neither these nor the MIPT database
provide complete and consistent worldwide coverage.) For the
period 1968–1997, the MIPT database includes mainly interna-
tional events involving actors from at least two countries, while for
1998–2008 it includes both domestic and international events
from much of the world. (The MIPT data were originally drawn
from the RAND Terrorism Chronology 1968–1997, the RAND-
MIPT Terrorism Incident database (1998–Present), the Terrorism
Indictment database (University of Arkansas & University of
Δt ∝ 1/s
s→ s + η
x ∝ s
Figure 1. A model of terrorist organizations. A schematic illustrating the feedback loop relationship between size s and the frequency and
severity of attacks: the delay between subsequent attacks Dt is inversely related to an organization’s size s while the severity of subsequent attacks x
grows with s; new events lead to recruitment which leads to growth, which increases the size variable s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048633.g001
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Oklahoma), and DFI International’s research on terrorist organi-
zations. In 2008, however, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security discontinued its funding for the maintenance of the
database in favor of the University of Maryland’s START center’s
Global Terrorism Database [46].) Each event is defined as an
attack on a single target in a single location (city) on a single day.
For example, the Al Qaeda attacks in the United States on 11
September 2001 appear as three events in the database, one for
each of the New York City, Washington D.C. and Shanksville,
Pennsylvania locations. Each record includes the date, target, city
(if applicable), country, type of weapon used, terrorist group(s)
responsible (if known), number of deaths (if known), number of
injuries (if known), a brief description of the attack and the source
of the information.
The organizations identified in the MIPT database are a
superset of those contained in the BAAD data set, and we will use
these additional data analyses that do not require size estimates.
For each organization, we extracted the full sequence of its
attributed or claimed events. This yields 10,335 events worldwide
from 1968–2008 associated with 910 identifiable organizations.
For each of the 1,204 events worldwide with unknown severity, we
assign a severity of x~0 to preserve timing information. Further,
because of the day-level temporal resolution of events in the
database, multiple events on the same day by the same group have
ambiguous ‘‘delay’’ (inverse frequency). We eliminate this ambi-
guity by aggregating such events into a single ‘‘event day’’ with
severity equal to the sum of the component severities. This slightly
reduces the number of events, mainly for the most active
organizations late in their life history. As a consequence, the
minimum resolvable delay in the database for two events by the
same organization is Dt~1 day.
Regression models
Before analyzing the evolution of attacks by individual
organizations we conduct static or cross-sectional regression
analysis at the level of individual organizations. We examine the
relationship between group size and attack patterns, in particular
the delay between attacks, the experience of a group in terms of
number of events, and the severity of attacks.
To recap, we expect larger groups to generate a larger number
of attacks, have shorter delays between attacks (H1), and generate
more severe attacks even accounting for other attack patterns (H4).
We can evaluate H1 by comparing maximum group size s from
BAAD and the minimum delay between attacks Dt in MIPT. We
can assess H4 by comparing size and the maximum severity x of
attacks. Finally, H2 implies that larger groups should have higher
maximum experience k or cumulative number of events. (H3,
postulating a declining delay with subsequent attack, cannot be
evaluated with static data; we return to this point later).
Although group size should predict attack patterns, individual
measures such as maximum severity will be at least in part a
function of the total number of attacks. That is, for any
distribution of severities, an increased production rate (sampling
intensity) will naturally inflate the maximum severity over a fixed
time period, even if the distribution is stationary. Thus, in order to
examine the partial relationship between size and the related
attack variables–or their independent predictive value on size once
we take into account the other attack pattern characteristics–it is
more convenient to consider to what extent we can account for
size as function of the attack measures.
We use an ordered logit regression model of size since the
BAAD data give order-of-magnitude estimates of maximum size.
As the BAAD data pertain to the time period 1998–2005, we
restrict our attack pattern measures to attacks during this same
time period. Since the distributions of minimum delay, maximum
experience, and maximum severity are all highly skewed we take
the natural logarithm, adding 1 to severity to prevent taking the
log of 0 in the case of non-fatal events. We report the empirical
estimates in Table 1.
The results display a significant negative relationship between
fatal attack delay and group size, consistent with our claim that
larger groups will have shorter delays between attacks (H1). We
also find a positive relationship between group size and
experience, consistent with our claim that larger groups generate
a higher number of attacks (H2). Finally, the maximum severity of
the attacks is not significantly related to group size, once we have
controlled for delay and experience variables. This contradicts the
hypothesis that larger groups are systematically more likely to
generate severe attacks (H4). Overall, the model places 58.75% of
all the groups in the correct bins for group size. Only 5% of the
observations are badly mis-classified, with predictions off by more
than one order of magnitude. By contrast, a null model predicting
all groups to have the modal size category (100{1000) only
classified 43.75% of the observations correctly. (We considered a
number of alternative specifications. Severity remains an insignif-
icant predictor of group size when we consider combinations of
Figure 2. Simulated development of a terrorist organization. (A) Median event delay Dt vs. cumulative number of events k, for 10,000
simulated terrorist organizations and three choices of the number of cells v/g added per event. Dashed line shows the function Dt/k21, from Eq. (1).
(B) Median size (number of terrorist ‘‘cells’’ s/v) vs. calendar time from the first event, showing exponential growth with rate set by v/g.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048633.g002
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delay and experience for both deadly and non-deadly attacks.
Using a linear regression model rather than ordered logit does not
change our substantive conclusions).
Since the BAAD data cover only about half of the identifiable
organizations in the MIPT database over a restricted time span
(1998–2005), we conduct a supplementary analysis with the full
MIPT dataset, where we consider how a group’s total experience
can be accounted for by differences in minimum delay and
maximum attack severity. (We limit the analysis to MIPT
organization that generated at least two events (frequency) and
one deadly event (severity); only 167 organizations satisfy these
criteria.) Table 2 report the results for a linear regression with
logged values for all the terms for fatal (F ) and all attacks (A,
including non-fatal attacks) experience respectively. The results
clearly show that the minimum delay is a significant predictor of
group experience, and they mildly support the claim about
severity, as the positive coefficient for severity is significantly
different from 0. However, comparing the change in the R2 for
estimating the model with and without the severity and delay
terms respectively indicates that dropping the severity variable
leads to a relatively small decline, while the impact of omitting the
delay variables is substantial. Hence, variation in delay between
attacks accounts for much more of the variation in experience than
does severity.
These static analyses provide substantial preliminary evidence
in support of H1 and H2 and little evidence to support H4. We
now go beyond static analyses and test our predictions for all
organizations in the MIPT database using a novel dynamical
analysis tool called a ‘‘development curve’’.
Developmental dynamics
A development curve is a statistical tool that measures the
evolution of organization behavioral variables along a common
quantitative timeline [22]. It is similar in structure and use to the
‘‘experience’’, ‘‘learning’’ and ‘‘progress curves’’ sometimes used in
management science [36,39] to quantify the relationship between
per-item production cost (or time) and ‘‘experience’’ (cumulative
item production). Because we study behavioral variables rather
than the costs of production, and to explicitly avoid implying
learning-based mechanisms, we choose a distinct term. The
analysis of these developmental curves facilitates direct compar-
isons of the behaviors of different groups at similar points in their
life histories, which is useful for testing our hypotheses.
We instrument a common timeline using organizational
experience k, defined as the cumulative number of events
produced by or associated with a particular organization, and
we compare the delay Dt between the kth and (kz1)th events, or
the severity x of the kth attack, across all organizations in our
sample. For each of the 910 organizations, we extract from the
MIPT event data an ordered sequence of coordinates
f(1,z1),(2,z2), . . .g, which represent the group’s behavioral trajec-
tory on the variable z over its lifetime. The visualization of such
trajectory is typically made using double-logarithmic axes, as
illustrated in our simulation results in Figure 2. Although the curve
construction itself ignores details such as the date of an
organization’s first attack, its location, ideology, etc., these
variables can be used for subsequent analysis, e.g., comparing
the trajectories across covariates.
Constructing a development curve for an individual organiza-
tion (see Text S1) can facilitate the investigation of specific
behavioral dynamics of individual groups over their lifetimes.
However, the specific factors associated with particular organiza-
tions may obscure the generic tendency embodied by our
hypothesis. To investigate these, we examine the average
trajectory across many organizations by tabulating the conditional
distribution Pr (Dt Dk) of delays, for a specified level of experience
k. Thus, an organization that has carried out k events contributes
to each of the kƒk conditional distributions. This approach
provides a strong test of the frequency-acceleration (H3) and
attack-severity hypotheses (H4) predictions.
Frequency of attacks over time. Figure 3A shows the
composite frequency curve for all organizations in our study. To
reduce the overprinting effects of showing the trajectories for so
many organizations, we bin the values of k on a logarithmic scale
and plot the mean and 1st and 3rd quartiles of the data within
each bin. Remarkably, the observed empirical pattern agrees very
closely with our simulation model’s predictions (Figure 2).
The progressive decrease of the delay distributions indicates a
generic tendency toward faster production with increased expe-
rience for all types of organizations, in strong agreement with the
frequency-acceleration hypothesis (H3). But, the relationship
between delay and experience is not deterministic: not every
event occurs more quickly than the last but the statistical tendency
toward shorter delays is clear.
A terrorist organization thus typically begins in the low-
frequency domain (large Dt) and moves in fits and starts toward
the high-frequency domain (small Dt). This trend is not subtle: the
median delay after the 1st event is Dt~124 days, while by the
12th event, it has dropped to 35 days and by the 25th, the next
event typically comes only 21 days later. This transition to fast
production does take considerable calendar time: for groups that
Table 1. Ordered logit regression of group size, by fatal
attack patterns.
Variable b^ SE(b^)
Delay: ln min(Dt) 20.351 0.119
Experience: ln max(k) 0.707 0.193
Severity: ln max(x) 0.150 0.159
a^0D1 20.163 0.840
a^1D2 2.652 0.895
a^2D3 5.039 1.056
N = 80, LR x2 = 41.42, df = 3, 58.75% correctly classified.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048633.t001
Table 2. Linear regression of experience, by attack delay and
severity.
Fatal attacks (F) All attacks (A)
Variable b^ SE(b^) b^ SE(b^)
DelayF: ln min(Dt) 20.119 0.042 20.110 0.040
DelayA: ln min(Dt) 20.778 0.110 20.795 0.105
DelayF6
DelayA
0.074 0.017 0.073 0.016
Severity: ln max(x) 0.190 0.059 0.150 0.056
a^ 3.115 0.236 3.336 0.225
N = 167, R2 = 0.545 N = 167, R2 = 0.565
R2 (:severity) = 0.515 R2 (:severity) = 0.546
R2 (:delay) = 0.222 R2 (:delay) = 0.182
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048633.t002
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achieve k~12 events, the median total calendar time between the
first and twelfth event is 4:4 years. Similar results hold for the
timing between deadly attacks.
None of the sampled organizations progressively slowed their
attack rate over time, moving from high-frequency to low-
frequency. A few unusual groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Land
of Two Rivers, begin and remain in the high-frequency domain.
But, Al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers is an interesting case
because it is well-known to have operated under a different name
prior to 2004 [49]; thus, their initial high-frequency behavior can
be interpreted as support for the labor-constraint hypothesis (H1)
because their initial larger size–a hold over from their previous
identity–allowed them to ‘‘begin’’ life (k~1) at a relatively high
initial production rate of attacks.
Statistical model for the frequency of
attacks. Quantifying the dynamical relationship between delays
and experience allows us to go beyond our static analyses. To do
this, we statistically model the conditional distribution Pr (Dt Dk)
from which delays are drawn and how this distribution varies with
experience.
For these data, a truncated log-normal distribution, with the
following mathematical form
Pr (Dt Dk) ! exp
{( logDtzb log k{m)2
2s2
" #
, ð1Þ
provides an excellent fit to the empirical delay data for all
organizations. Here, s2 is the variance in delays at a given k, m is
related to the characteristic delay between attacks and b controls
the rate at which that delay decreases with increased experience k.
That is, b governs the strength of the feedback loop between
organizational experience and the production of new events. To
include the effect of the minimum timing resolution Dt§1 present
in the empirical data, we force Pr (Dt Dk)~0 for Dtv1 day.
This mathematical structure implies that the typical delay
between attacks generically decreases according to a power-law
function with increasing experience.
Dt&emk{b: ð2Þ
(Details of this derivation are given in Text S1.) Thus, if bw0,
we will observe a transition toward increasingly fast event
production, indicating support for H3. In contrast, if b~0,
production rates do not vary with organizational experience, while
if bv0, production rates will decrease (larger Dt) with increasing
experience. In the bw0 regime predicted by H3, the acceleration
effect is dampened as the mean delay asymptotes to the minimum
timing resolution at Dt~1; this produces slight upward curvature
for large values of k (see Text S1).
The particular value of b has a strong effect on the material
dynamics of the feedback loop between increasing experience and
increasing production. If b~1, then the feedback loop is linear, as
in our simulation model, and increases in organizational
experience lead to proportional increases in event production.
Linearity implies that the marginal growth associated with an
additional event is relatively constant over the organization’s
lifetime and a roughly constant fraction of new recruits are
allocated to increase overall tempo of militant activities.
In contrast, b?1 implies a non-linear feedback process.
Notably, non-linear feedback processes are not common models
of social processes (but see the literature on arms-races,
particularly [17] and [50]). Traditional models often focus on
proportional effects in which increases in one variable cause
proportional changes in other variables. In non-linear feedback
processes, small increases in one variable can produce dramatic
and continuing swings in other variables, leading to highly
unpredictable dynamics [51].
When bw1, the feedback is super-linear, and one or both of
these factors must increase with k. That is, either per-event growth
in militant activities increases over time or an increasing fraction of
growth is allocated to militant activities. When bv1, the feedback
is sub-linear and the marginal recruitment benefits of new events
decrease over time or they are constant but recruits are
increasingly allocated toward non-militant activities.
Fitting this model directly to the empirical data on all events, we
find that the maximum likelihood estimate is b^~1:0+0:1 (std.
err.), indicating linear feedback. (This approach to estimating the
parameter gives weight to the events early in organization’s
lifetime that is proportional to the number of such events in our
data set; in contrast, a simple regression approach on the mean
delays would bias the estimate by giving significant weight to the
rare but long-lived groups.) Using a Monte Carlo simulation
against a null model with fixed b~0 (no acceleration over time)
Figure 3. Timing of events. (A) Mean delay ,log Dt. between attacks, with 1st and 3rd quartiles, vs. group experience k. Solid line shows the
expected mean delay, from the statistical model described in the text. (B) A ‘‘data collapse’’ showing the alignment of the re-scaled conditional delay
distributions Pr (Dt:kb^ Dk) with the estimated underlying log-normal distribution, as predicted by the model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048633.g003
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and with m, s estimated using maximum likelihood given the fixed
b value, we find that the value of b^ is highly statistically significant
(pv0:001). (Fitting to deadly attacks alone yields a highly
statistically significant b^~1:1+0:2, slightly in the super-linear
regime, but this value is statistically indistinguishable from b~1).
A linear feedback implies that the marginal growth from event-
driven recruitment does not vary much with organizational size or
experience. Furthermore, it implies that organizational learning in
terrorist groups [25,38], in which the production rate increases
due to improved efficiency of a fixed number of individuals, plays
a lesser role in explaining the overall acceleration of event
production than do the effects of increasing organizational size,
because learning would mimic the effect of super-linear feedback
by allowing a constant number of militants to behave identically to
an increasing number.
A strong test of the statistical model’s plausibility is its prediction
that each of the k conditional delay distributions Pr (Dt Dk) is a
scaled version of the underlying log-normal distribution LN(m,s2).
To test this prediction, we re-scale the empirical distributions by
the predicted factor, i.e., we multiply each delay variable Dti by
k
b^
i , and then plot them against the estimated underlying log-
normal distribution. A close alignment of these re-scaled
conditional distributions, also called a ‘‘data collapse’’ [52], is
strong evidence for the hypothesized data model over a wide range
of alternatives. Furthermore, for an alternative model to produce
such a data collapse requires that it follows the log-normal form
closely enough to be effectively equivalent. Figure 3B shows the
results of this test, illustrating an excellent data collapse, with each
of the re-scaled log-normal conditional distributions closely
aligning with the underlying log-normal form.
These results also hold when we consider the development
curves for groups with a common political ideology (see Text S1).
[53] divides the political motivations for terrorism into four
conventional categories: nationalist-separatist, reactionary, reli-
gious and revolutionary. We coded according to Miller’s criteria
the 131 most prolific groups in our sample (all with k§10 deadly
events), which accounts for 85% of events, and fitted Eq. (1) to the
data within each ideological category. Organizations with multiple
political motivations were placed in multiple categories, which
would only lessen any differences between estimated parameters
for different categories. Within each of these categories, we
observe the same acceleration pattern, with the strongest
acceleration (largest b) appearing for religious groups (Table 3).
Severity of attacks over time. In contrast to the delay
development curve, we find no statistically significant relationship
between the severity of attacks and increased experience (Pearson’s
r~{0:024, t-test, p~0:17), indicating no support for the severity-
increase hypothesis (H4). Across all organizations in our sample,
the average severity of the first deadly event is SxT~6:7+0:9,
which is only slightly larger than the average severity of deadly
events by highly experienced groups (those with kw100)
SxT~5:1+0:6. Figure 4A shows the composite severity curve
for all organizations in our study.
As with the frequency curves, we find that the conditional
severity distributions Pr (x Dk) roughly collapse onto a single,
underlying form (Figure 4B), which is similar to the power law
observed for all deadly terrorist attacks worldwide from 1968–
2008 [20,31]. That is, Richardson’s Law for terrorism appears to
hold for both inexperienced and highly experienced groups.
Combined with our static analysis of organizational size, this
pattern implies a highly counter-intuitive fact: the severity of
attacks by larger, more experienced organizations, is not
significantly greater than the severity of attacks by small,
inexperienced organizations. That is, the common assumption
that only experienced groups are capable of such mass destruction
[54] is incorrect: inexperienced organizations are just as likely to
produce extremely severe events as highly experienced organiza-
tions.
However, although more experienced organizations are not
systematically more lethal at the individual-event level, the
observed frequency-acceleration pattern implies that more expe-
rienced groups are significantly more lethal overall. This pattern
was observed by [8] in their analysis of the BAAD organizations.
Our results thus clarify their results, showing that the observed
correlation between greater lethality (total deaths attributed to an
organization) and greater organizational size appears because
larger, more experienced organizations produce events more
quickly than smaller, less experienced organizations. It is the
cumulative effect of the many small events that generates an
increased lethality, not a systematic increase in the lethality of
individual events.
Repeating this analyses on our ideology-coded set of organiza-
tions, we find no systematic dependence of severity of attacks on
organizational experience within any of the ideological categories
(see Text S1). That is, none of the model coefficients are
significant, and the average severity of events within each category
vary only a little. In short, we find that political ideology has no
systematic impact on the severity of events or the trajectory that
event severities take over the lifespan of an organization.
Discussion
Although details and circumstances vary widely across terrorist
organizations, the generic nature of our results suggests general
conclusions. In particular, we find strong evidence for a positive
feedback loop among organizational size (number of personnel),
experience (cumulative number of events) and the frequency at
which that organization launches new events. Small and
inexperienced organizations tend to produce events slowly, while
larger and more experienced organizations tend to produce events
sometimes hundreds of times more frequently.
Within this feedback loop, new attacks lead to organizational
growth and the corresponding increase in size leads to faster
production of new events because a larger size means more
terrorist cells are operating in parallel, not because events
themselves are planned more quickly. The result of this feedback
Table 3. Frequency curve parameters for organizations with
similar political motivations.
political
motivation groups events m s b significance
nationalist-
separatist
55 2959 5.1(5) 2.2(1) 0.9(2) p,0.001
reactionary 5 143 3.2(6) 1.8(2) 0.1(3) p,0.001
religious 17 999 5(1) 2.4(5) 1.7(5) p,0.001
revolutionary 53 2527 5.7(4) 2.3(2) 1.1(2) p,0.001
all secular 883 6232 5.2(2) 2.25(9) 0.9(1) p,0.001
all groups 910 7231 5.1(2) 2.32(9) 1.0(1) p,0.001
Note: statistical significance estimated via Monte Carlo simulation of a two-tail
test against a null model with b= 0 (no frequency acceleration), using the sum-
of-squared errors (SSE). Values in parentheses indicate bootstrap standard
uncertainty in the last digit.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048633.t003
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loop is a generic ‘‘developmental’’ trajectory: as an organization
ages, it tends to produce violent events more and more quickly.
The typical form of this relationship can be mathematically
modeled by a power-law function, in which the delay Dt between
consecutive events decreases roughly like Dt!k{b where k counts
the cumulative number of events and b describes the strength and
direction of the feedback loop. The implication of the power-law
pattern is that large organizations are very much like ‘‘scaled up’’
versions of small organizations, and in particular that size and
experience are coupled in a positive feedback loop.
Across all organizations in our sample, we estimate
b~1:0+0:1, indicating a linear feedback loop, which implies
that an organization’s overall size is strongly correlated with the
size of its militant wing. This pattern is strongest for small or
inexperienced organizations, e.g., those with kƒ10 events, which
covers 87% of the 910 organizations in our sample. In contrast,
highly experienced organizations seem to saturate their event
production rates at the daily or weekly level, which may be
indicative of a tendency of large organizations to engage in
multiple types of activities, e.g., the provision of social services,
criminal activities, etc., continuing to grow their militant wings.
The mathematical precision of this relationship is striking, as is
the ability of our computer simulation to reproduce it. Except for
Richardson’s Law for the frequency and severity of wars, few
statistical relationships in the study of political violence exhibit
such regularity.
The power-law relation between organizational experience and
production rate is both conceptually and mathematically similar to
the relationship between cost and cumulative production observed
in manufacturing [36] or organizational learning [37,39], where
decreases in per-item production costs or time can be described by
a power law in the cumulative number of items produced. That a
similar patterns appears in the production of terrorist events is
surprising, and it may not be superficial to describe terrorist
organizations as a special type of manufacturing firm whose
principal product is political violence and whose overall produc-
tion of violence is fundamentally constrained by its size.
The implication is that terrorism is inherently non-amenable to
mass production, i.e., it is not a scalable enterprise, perhaps
because each event must be humanly conceived and planned
around a particular target, tactic or environment, and there is a
limit to how much this process can be automated. One implication
of this conclusion for cyber-terrorism is that even there, despite the
great potential for automating attacks, these too will likely not be
scalable without advances in general artificial intelligence.
In the language of economics, we say that terrorism capital and
labor are not freely substitutable with respect to producing new
events. If the day-to-day work of event production does not require
specialized skills, then the growth potential of an organization be
extremely large because it may draw on the largest possible pool of
potential recruits. This point suggests that conflict-level event
production rates should ultimately be responsive to policy and
counter-terrorism efforts that target the size and mobility of the
pool of potential recruits. That is, successful ‘‘hearts and minds’’
strategies [55] are likely to lead directly to lower incident rates by
both restricting the growth and reducing the size of terrorist
organizations. They may not, however, eliminate the possibility of
spectacular attacks as these do not depend on organizational size.
Recently, following our original work on progress curves in
terrorism [22], Johnson et al. [25] analyzed the timing of events in
the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, finding similar power-law like
acceleration curves in the delay between events. They argue that
this pattern is caused by a kind of ‘‘red queen’’ effect–a concept
borrowed from arms races in evolutionary biology [56]–in which
two sides of the conflict race through some abstract space, and the
timing between events is given by how far ‘‘ahead’’ the insurgent
side is in the race. In practice, however, this explanation is difficult
to validate because the connection is not specified as to how real-
world events and structures drive the dynamics of the abstract
race. In contrast, our explanation of the phenomena is both
tangible, general and testable: we argue that the size of the
insurgency or the terrorist group sets the tempo of the conflict.
The more people there are fighting, the more frequently we will
observe events. This explanation makes direct and testable
predictions about the relationship of organizational size and
frequency of events, which we show are upheld by empirical data
on organizational sizes. (As a technical note, in the language of
physics, the ‘‘size’’ of an organization or insurgency is an extensive
variable of the conflict system, much like area and number of
particles are for physical systems [57]; this fact makes additional
testable predictions of our theory.) The implication for the Iraq
and Afghanistan conflicts is that the number of insurgents active in
the various provinces is the primary determinant of the frequency
of events observed there.
Although the acceleration is remarkably strong, the vast
majority of organizations do not achieve high levels of experience
(only 23% of groups are associated with kw10 events) or fast
Figure 4. Severity of events. (A) Mean severity ,log x. of deadly attacks, with 1st and 3rd quartile, vs. group experience k. Solid line (with slope
zero) shows the expected delay, from a simple regression model. (B) Conditional severity distributions Pr(x/k), showing a data collapse onto a heavy-
tailed distribution, with the maximum likelihood power-law model for all severities (Richardson’s Law).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048633.g004
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production rates. The progressive loss of organizations could be
due to high rates of organizational death, e.g., from counter-
terrorism activities or internal conflicts [44,58], shifts away from
violence, or a right-censoring effect on young and still active
organizations. Significantly, the particular mode of organizational
demise seems not to have a strong impact on the production time
of events, suggesting that the transition from development (growth)
to death may happen very quickly, so that the experience curve
does not bend upward but rather simply halts. Further exploration
of the death of organizations [44,58], and how it impacts the
production of violence, is an interesting avenue for future work.
Regardless of the reason, we do not expect the feedback loop to
continue as k??. If an organization succeeds in becoming large
enough to produce new events each day, it may function more like
a stable or mature social institution, with fundamentally different
constraints and incentives on the production of violence. Large
size and stability may also pose special risks, e.g., leading to larger
or longer conflicts. On the other hand, non-violent activities, e.g.,
engagement with political processes, may also become more
attractive with increased size. Exploring these possibilities is an
interesting avenue for future work.
Unlike the production of events, we find no evidence of any
relationship with the severity of attacks (H4). Rather, Richardson’s
Law–a power-law distribution in the frequency of severe events–
characterizes the severity of events at all levels of organizational
size or experience, and independent of the organization’s political
ideology.
This fact clarifies ongoing efforts to identify the underlying
social, political or physical mechanism that generates Richardson’s
Law in terrorism. Several existing explanations assume or predict
a severity-size relationship, e.g., the aggregation-disintegration
model of Johnson et al. [23] and [35], but these seem increasingly
unlikely given our results here, because they assume the maximum
severity of an event is proportional to the organization’s size N;
thus, if N is small, the severity of events x will also be small. That
is, in their existing form, these models predict a severity-size
relationship that does not appear in the data. Of course, these
models may be adapted to produce the observed size-indepen-
dence pattern, but doing so requires additional assumptions and
additional validation that may not be warranted.
In contrast, two plausible explanations are not ruled out: (i) the
explanation proposed in [20], which posits a coevolutionary
competition between states and terrorists in which event planning
time and severity are strongly related, and (ii) the explanation
proposed in [24], in which population densities are broad-scaled
and terrorists preferentially target high-density locations. Both of
these explanations do not assume any relation between the severity
of an attack and the size of an organization.
Together, our results suggest that the total lethality of larger and
more mature groups observed by Asal and Rethemeyer [8] is
probably best explained as a natural consequence of their much
more frequent activities, rather than as a systematic increase in the
deadliness of individual events. Policies that limit the growth of an
organization’s militant wing should lower the long-term probabil-
ity of a severe event by that organization. Such growth-limiting
policies could be described as ‘‘starving the beast’’ of the labor
necessary to produce rare but highly severe events.
The most productive targets of such policies will be large,
established organizations with long histories of producing terrorist
attacks. By virtue of their size, these organizations are likely to be
well-known players in their particular conflicts and thus easy
targets for specific policies. Because small organizations are equally
likely to produce severe events, policies aimed specifically at large,
well-known organizations may not limit the overall risk of severe
events from all sources. For small and potentially unknown
organizations, the most effective policies may be those aimed at
preventing their formation in the first place, i.e., policies that
curtail the acquisition of the means for and resort to violence.
Lacking this, once such a terrorist cell carries out its first attack and
begins its developmental trajectory, the best action by a
government may be an ‘‘overwhelming response’’ to encourage
through various means the dissolution of the nascent organization
and the truncation of its growth trajectory. This policy is not
without risk to the state, however, as certain countermeasures may
serve the terrorist’s goals [59,60].
In closing, we point out that the acceleration in the frequency of
terrorist events is independent of many commonly studied factors
associated with terrorism, including geographic location, time
period, international vs. domestic targets, ideological motivations
(religious, national-separatist, reactionary, etc.), and political
context. Our results thus demonstrate that some aspects of
terrorism are not nearly as contingent or unpredictable as is often
assumed and the actions of terrorists may be constrained by
processes unrelated to strategic tradeoffs among costs, benefits and
preferences. Identifying and understanding these processes offers a
complementary approach to the traditional rational-actor frame-
work, and a new way to understand what regularities exist, why
they exist, what they imply for long-term social and political
stability, e.g., large-scale violent conflicts like civil and interstate
wars.
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